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Opening  
This chapter connects Heidegger’s critique of identity and metaphysics 
with his later work on the question of technology to propose that photography, 
understood as an image making technology, provides a privileged point of entry 
into the question of ontological difference. The work of Lyotard and Deleuze, 
while not directly engaging with photography, seems to be pointing in this 
direction. My assertion is that the ‘step back’ out of metaphysics does not 
proceed by way of language (as Heidegger would have it) but by the way of the 
technical image. For this reason, photography is the visual counterpart of non-
representational thinking. This paper argues that Heidegger’s inability to exit 
metaphysics is tied to his failure to recognise that such a leap is accomplished 
by means of an automata, or technology that is capable of mimetic expression. 
The understanding of photography as the poetic expression of techne, implies 
that photography is the ‘graven image’ of the age of cybernetics and allows to 
suggest that a leap out of metaphysics is best performed not in the field of 
language but in the space of the technical image. This leap, if successful, might 
open a path towards philosophy that works with technical images instead, or 
alongside of language. 
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Representation and identity 
Although he rarely discusses it directly, representation (vorstellung) is 
arguably one of the central issues for Heidegger’s thought because the logic of 
representation is tied to the principle of identity and by implication to his 
critique of metaphysics. This argument unfolds in the following way: The 
history of Western philosophy is a history of forgetting that there cannot be a 
ground that is not externally given. Thought cannot withdraw from metaphysics 
because thought is expressed in language, and language represents. Because 
language represents, it neglects to inquire after the origin of representation, 
therefore placing representation as the ground of thought and in this way 
inaugurating transcendental metaphysics.1  
The suggestion advanced below is that photography, understood as 
technology that makes legible images, is a privileged point of exit out of 
metaphysics because photography does not get entangled in the tendency of 
language to operate through the implicit acceptance of the logic of 
representation and for that reason it is free from the norms of metaphysical 
thinking. The attempt to demonstrate that photography can succeed in ‘leaping 
out’ of metaphysics where language fails is significantly complicated by the fact 
that photography is usually and for the most part identified with representation. 
This widespread acceptance of photography as the sine qua non of 
representation was largely overlooked by scholars, and I aim to demonstrate 
here that this results in a one sided and instrumental approach that tends to 
disregard the fact that in photography representation is both sustained and 
overcome precisely because the photograph is an automata, i.e. it is an image 
created not through the agency of human subjectivity but through an imitation 
of it. In what follows I argue that photography is on the one hand an analytic 
category that characterises contemporary culture as thoroughly 
representationalist while on the other hand suggesting a possibility of resistance 
to representation from within the same technical assemblage understood as a 
repetitive and reproductive process. In other words, photography is both a figure 
______________________________________ 
1 For a detailed discussion of representation in Heidegger see: Colebrook, Claire. 1999. Ethics 
and Representation: From Kant to Post-structuralism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
55-92. 
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of representation and the means by which representation can be overcome. In 
effect, photography is both identity and difference.  
We must pause here for a while to take stock of these four dovetailed 
terms: representation, identity, metaphysics and technology, in order to explore 
how they come to define and organise the episteme in the Western world and 
what is their purchase on photography as the image of philosophy that is yet to 
come. 
 First of all, identity of which Heidegger says  ‘The usual formulation of 
the principle of identity reads: A=A. The principle of identity is considered the 
highest principle of thought’.2 Identity makes the world knowable because it 
affirms that ‘Everything is what it is’ (Leibniz), or that subjects are identified by 
their predicates: A cul-de-sac (subject) is ‘a street or passage closed at one end’ 
(predicate). The predicate is what permits the subject to subsist, no matter where 
in the world the aforementioned cul-de-sac is found, while providing a 
categorical test of its cul-de-sac-ness: if it is not closed at one end it does not 
qualify, therefore eliminating the possibility of contradictions. What gives the 
principle of identity its universal force is the little copula is that posits a 
necessary logical relation between the subject and predicate. In the formula ‘A 
is A’ the is guaranties the correspondence of the two parts of the equation. Here 
we come face to face with the forgotten origin of the principle of identity. For 
we have no way of guaranteeing the truth of this ‘necessary logical relation’. 
We have just learned that subjects are known by their predicates, but how are 
we to learn what is means? We know which conditions must be meet for a street 
to be a cul-de-sac, but which conditions must be meet for is to be ‘necessary 
logical relation’? It appears that for ‘A is A’ to be of any value, we must accept 
beforehand the truth of the is. The formula ‘A is A’ therefore functions as a kind 
of laboratory that analyses various statements about the world to establish if 
they are true or not. The statement ‘3+2 is 5’ goes into the laboratory and the 
outcome is ‘true’; the statement ‘3+3 is 5’ goes into the laboratory and the 
outcome is ‘false’. So far so good, but the caveat is that there is no, nor can 
there be, a laboratory in which we can place the formula ‘A is A’ itself to 
______________________________________ 
2 Heidegger, Martin. Identity and Difference. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York, 
Evanston, and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002, 23. 
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establish if it is true or not. The story of science is therefore a story of a 
laboratory that operates on unknown premises. In other words the principle of 
identity is a ‘black box’ of which we are unable to say whether it provides true 
or false answers. Reflecting on this problem in The Principle of Identity, 
Heidegger summarises the situation like this:  
Everywhere, wherever and however we are related to beings of 
every kind, we find identity making its claim on us. If this claim 
were not made […] there would then also not be any science. For if 
science could not be sure in advance of the identity of its object in 
each case, it could not be what it is. […] Thus, what is successful 
and fruitful about scientific knowledge is everywhere based on 
something useless.3 
So on the one hand, without identity there would not be any science, 
because there would be no criterion to tell true and false statements apart; nor, 
on the other hand is it possible to verify that the law of identity itself is true 
because identity is the verification principle, and unless one is Baron 
Münchausen, one cannot pull himself up by his own bootstraps. Science that 
starts from the principle of identity is culpable of positing a ground without 
however providing the means with which this ground can be accounted for, and 
is therefore yet another form of religious thought that develops on the basis of 
transcendental principles, or as Heidegger succinctly puts it: 
Why is science theology? Answer: because science is the 
systematic development of knowledge, the Being of beings knows 
itself as this knowledge, and thus it is in truth.4 
Metaphysics. What we habitually call ‘objective knowledge’ appears, at 
the last count, as nothing more than wishful thinking, for the principle of 
identity, whose explicit purpose is to rid knowledge of ambiguity and paradox, 
is exposed as both ambiguous and paradoxical. But it gets worse, as the 
principle of identity dominates not only scientific thought but also metaphysics 
which is supposed to keep science in check by studying the fundamental nature 
of knowledge. But rather than being the guardian of science, metaphysics is 
______________________________________ 
3 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 26-7. 
4 ibid. 54. 
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guilty of sleeping on the job, as it internalised the language of scientific 
reasoning, accepted ‘A is A’ as the expression of the grounding of being in 
logic and is therefore complicit in the mediation of existence through logos. The 
tendency of philosophy to accept the principle of identity as its own foundation 
finds its fullest expression in German Idealism and culminates in Hegel’s 
famous statement that ‘What is rational is real and what is real is rational’.5 
Here the principle of identity, as the decisive expression of rationality, is 
officially elevated to the status of ultimate reality. Against Hegel’s 
identification of reality with logos, and by implication with thought, Heidegger 
maintains that  philosophy must free itself from the principle of identity by 
exposing the foundations of the principle of identity itself. This however is 
easier said then done, as ‘A is A’ is the ground of thinking. What is needed is a 
‘step back out of metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics’ or in 
other words, Heidegger wants to get beyond the ‘is’ in ‘A is A’, to a place of 
mutual belonging between the subject and the predicate. The task of philosophy 
is to uncover the ontological difference that got buried under the principle of 
identity.6  
Representation. When rational discourse (backed up, as we saw by 
science and metaphysics) is considered as the only legitimate form of 
knowledge capable of overcoming illusions, correcting errors and avoiding 
contradictions, representation is pressed into service as the de facto dominant 
mode by which the world can be known. Representation marks a break with 
older forms of knowledge in which divine revelation, the bible or mysticism 
were the sources of truth. For in representation knowledge is not given from 
above, it is not received from outside by means of god, sorcery, faith or myth, 
rather knowledge is arrived at empirically through representing the world by 
means of rational reasoning. 5 is represented as 2+3, and this is so not because 
that is what the bible says, but because it can be rationally verified. For this 
reason representation is the threshold of modernity. As Heidegger puts it ‘The 
essence of the modern age can be seen in the fact that man frees himself from 
______________________________________ 
5 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2005. Philosophy of Right. Trans. S. W. Dyde Mineloa, 
N.Y.: Dover Publications, xix. 
6 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 52. 
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the bonds of the Middle Ages in freeing himself to himself’7. It is precisely 
because in the modern age man sees himself as autonomous that representation 
comes to be the guarantor of truth. To be a human being in this age means to be 
a subject for whom the world is represented as a picture, and true knowledge is 
guarantied by the correspondence between images and entities in the world. 
However, for Heidegger representation – as a mode of knowledge that 
privileges rationality – is taking its bearings from the same logos as the 
principle of identity itself. Representation shares with metaphysical thinking the 
forgetting of the ground on which it stands, but while the principle of identity 
and metaphysics determine the development of science and philosophy 
respectively, representation plays a greater role in the development of art and 
technology.  
There are two main ways by which photographic representation differs 
from representation in language. First, in photography representation is not 
camouflaged, but it is the very surface of the image. In other words, Heidegger 
says that in language ‘the little word ‘is’ appears ‘everywhere’, yet it does not 
‘appear expressly’ – i.e. representation is usually hidden behind forms of 
expression such as logic, rhetoric, metaphor and poetics8. On the other hand, in 
photography representation is explicit: it comes to the eye alongside the content 
of the photographic image, the very surface of the photograph is 
representational. Second, in language representation is concealed behind the 
intonation and the voice of the enunciator. Words – whether spoken or written – 
are always uttered by someone, which means that the notion of the speaking 
subject (present or absent) is inseparable from an utterance. In photography 
however the image is the outcome of a technical process. If technology is 
understood through Heidegger as poēsis it seems plausible that the ‘voice’ of 
photography is that of technology itself, rather than of a speaking subject. Even 
if for the time being it remains an open question whether the ‘voice’ of 
______________________________________ 
7 Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The age of the world picture. In The Question Concerning 
Technology. Trans. William Lovitt New York: Harper and Row. 128 
8 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 73. 
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technology can be heard in the content of the image, or if this technology 
undermines and dissolves the distinction between content and form.9  
Technology. In the first instance, the common way of thinking about 
technology (for example in disputes for and against technological determinism) 
is to define it as a field of human activity; the application of scientific 
knowledge for the construction of practical tools. However, Heidegger says that 
while this understanding is no doubt correct, it fails to account for the 
ontological significance of technology. For technology is not only instruments, 
machines and processes but a particular way of grasping the world, of getting to 
grips with that which is out-there: ‘Technology is therefore no mere means. 
Technology is a way of revealing’.10 This statement is of course entirely in line 
with Heidegger’s previously explored strategy to excavate the primordial, pre-
conceptual ground of Western science, philosophy and art. In coming to deal 
with presupposed ground of identity, metaphysics and representation Heidegger 
seeks in each case to uncover the original question that has to be necessarily 
forgotten for the ground to appear as solid foundation of thought. Science and 
metaphysics seek to ground the world in the principle of identity, determining in 
advance the shape of things to come. But, according to Heidegger, this 
grounding prevents one from asking the more fundamental question about the 
pre-ontological character of representation itself: 
[T]he step back out of metaphysics into the essential nature of 
metaphysics is the step out of technology and technological 
description and interpretation of the age, into the essence of 
modern technology which is still to be thought.11 
______________________________________ 
9 This understanding of poesis as an overcoming of form-content dualism is drawing on 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘the poetized’ as the expressive and pre-subjective essence of a poem. In 
‘Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin’ he says: ‘As a category of aesthetic investigation, the 
poetized differs decisively from the form-content model by preserving within itself the 
fundamental aesthetic unity of form and content. Instead of separating them, it distinctively 
stamps in itself their immanent, necessary connection.’ Benjamin, Walter. Selected Writings 
Vol. 1. 1913 - 1926. Cambridge, Mass; London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2005, 19. 
10 Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. Trans. 
William Lovitt New York : Harper and Row, 12. 
11 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 52 
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Technology is therefore a specific way of getting to the truth of being. 
Rethinking technology as the poetic essence of the age allows Heidegger to 
move away from the formula ‘truth = representation’ to a form of truth that is 
discovered in the creative processes of making, fetching and gathering. Human 
world is made through technology that acquires the status of the original 
oneness in which thinking and being are simultaneously held apart and together 
in the event of mutual appropriation. Central to this manoeuvre is the 
understanding of truth not as a logical certainty but as a form of revealing. 
Technology is revealing because it replaces the principle of identity with a 
process of creating, constructing and building, uncovering a deeper bond 
between humans and their world. However, this togetherness should not be 
understood as consistency, resemblance or similarity for all of the above require 
a prior condition of arbitration by human subjectivity, and in any case 
judgements of resemblance can only be conducted in the broad daylight, under 
the auspice of a logical procedure. In rejecting representation, Heidegger posits 
technology as the way by which the human being acquires a sense of identity 
through the process of acting in the world. For Heidegger, the self is formed in 
and through technology, because acting and creating in the world is the 
condition of being human.  
The person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object 
[…]Essentially the person exists only in the performance of 
intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object. Any 
psychical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking 
them as something psychical, is tantamount to depersonalization. A 
person is in any case given as a performer of intentional acts which 
are bound together by the unity of a meaning.’ 12 
Therefore Heidegger says that it is wrong to assume that one is using 
technology to achieve certain goals, rather, one becomes through technology 
and it is this becoming that constitutes what we later name ‘identity’, ‘ego’, 
‘subjectivity’ or ‘sovereignty’.13 Technology in Heidegger’s sense is pre-
______________________________________ 
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Edward Robinson and John Macquarrie (Malden, 
MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 73, (§4). 
13 Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic 
Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2012), 23-5, 38.  
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subjective, necessarily phenomenological relation that is capable of revealing 
the original difference between beings and being.  
Photography and difference 
In the final paragraphs of The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of 
Metaphysics Heidegger concludes that despite the efforts made by philosophy to 
critique metaphysical thinking, representation and subjectivity, there is an 
inherent difficulty in attempting to do so from within philosophical discourse 
because Western languages are built on the verb to be, and therefore are already 
imbued with the spirit of metaphysics: 
It must remain an open question whether the nature of Western 
languages is in itself marked with the exclusive brand of 
metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theo-logic, or 
whether these languages offer other possibilities of utterance–and 
that means at the same time of telling silence. […] The little word 
“is,” which speaks everywhere in our language, and tells of Being 
even where It does not appear expressly, contains the whole 
destiny of Being […].14 
In the remainder of this paper I will suggest that while it is true that 
language itself is imbued with the spirit of metaphysics, image-making 
technology is able to offer a way out of this impasse. Photography is the case in 
point, because it is a technical process that makes legible images that might just 
bridge the gap between the rational process of mechanical inscription by light 
and poetic expression. For Heidegger, as we have seen, technology is a mode of 
revealing: it allows access to deeper truth that is not accessible to 
representational thinking. But this truth is concealed because technology 
presents itself as means to an end, and its essence remains forgotten and hidden 
from view. In what follows I wish to argue that photography is not only a 
technology that makes images, but also the way by which technology inscribes 
itself into an image, and for that reason it is capable of making technology 
visible, allowing one to challenge the hegemony of representational paradigms 
and suggesting a possibility of a ‘step back out of metaphysics’ into the essence 
______________________________________ 
14 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 73. 
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of modern technology. This is not to strip photography of its value as 
correspondence, but to allow correspondence itself to acquire cohesion and to 
appear as both the ‘nothing’ and ‘something’ that together situate photography 
both within and beyond representation. One could say that photographic 
exposure overcomes the principle of identity (and therefore of representation) 
because it is the technique that harnesses the power of indeterminacy, of 
contingency and of repetition to establish a meaningful surface that is both 
present and intangible.  
As Heidegger pointed out, key metaphysical concepts such as 
‘subjectivity’, ‘identity’ and ‘representation’ are also the key onto-theo-logical 
principles by which language operates, which means that at the precise moment 
when philosophy attempts to perform an autopsy on one of these concepts, by 
the very fact of doing so it is forced into a representational mode that becomes 
the basis of the examination.15 For this reason Heidegger argues that while there 
is a fundamental divergence within thought that allows it to study itself, this 
divergence also ensures the impossibility of any thorough self-perception and 
radical self-examination, as any explicit attempt to examine representation or 
subjectivity is coming up against the implicit reliance of language on 
representation as its modus operandi. Heidegger further complicates the 
possibility of self-analysis by suggesting that this inability of language to 
represent representation to itself is also connected with the forming of 
subjectivity, which means that as soon as one posits oneself against 
representation to examine it, one is already taken over by representation to an 
extent that no radical examination is possible.16 The subject, the ‘I’ that attempts 
to catch representation is itself formed by the process of representation.17 
Therefore, it seems that representation and subjectivity are destined to remain 
the black hole of Western philosophy because, as Judovitz says: ‘we must rely 
______________________________________ 
15 Identity and Difference, 73. 
16 This criticism of subjectivity and representation gets is fullest development in Heidegger’s 
work on Kant. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. See also Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. 
17 This is particularly clear in “The Age of the World Picture”, Ibid., 115-155. 
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on the language of metaphysics, on its form, logic and implicit postulations, 
precisely at the moment when we seek to contest them.’18 
Yet, despite the entrapment of the subject by representation, Heidegger 
tentatively suggests that the possibility of questioning metaphysics ‘must 
remain an open question’. The roadmap for this questioning is spelled out thus: 
‘The ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for which it 
accounts, that is, by the causation through the supremely original matter–and 
that is the cause as causa sui.’19 The challenge therefore is to think the cause of 
philosophy, its non-philosophical beginning, as and origin that Heidegger 
ironically names ‘the god of philosophy’: ‘Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to 
this god. Before causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he 
play music and dance before this god.’ Getting out of metaphysics requires no 
less than abandoning the self-referential, self-causing way of thinking that is 
taking for granted what it is trying to prove. Accomplishing this task 
necessitates a ‘step back… out of metaphysics’.20 In what follows it will be 
suggested that stepping out of metaphysics into the causa sui of thought, 
requires the technology of stepping out of the visual into the forbidden territory 
of the graven image that lies beyond representation. This step out of the visual 
opens a window onto the unexplored realm of the photographic exposure, 
conceived here as the visual expression of the philosophical concept of 
difference. 21  
 
______________________________________ 
18 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 3. Heidegger’s ultimate failure to ‘get 
out of metaphysics’ is further discussed by Golding: ‘Heidegger’s analysis still required a kind 
of ground (ontic) to knowledge; that is, a kind of ”groundless ground”, he was still brought face-
to-face with the (quasi-) mystical onto-theo-logic Godhead haze itself. Toward the last of his 
days, a very disgruntled Heidegger claimed it was impossible, all things considered (and he had 
considered all things) to jump from the proverbial metaphysical ship.’ Johnny Golding, 
“Conversion on the Road to Damascus: Minority Report on Art,” In Gest: Laboratory of 
Synthesis. #1. Ed. Robert Garnett and Andrew Hunt (London: BookWorks in collaboration with 
Kingston University, 2010)  
19 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 72. 
20 ‘What is the origin of the onto-theological essential constitution of metaphysics? To accept 
this kind of question means to accomplish the step back’ Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 56. 
21 Ibid., 72. Deleuze names the non-philosophical origin of philosophy as Image of Thought see 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 164-213. 
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The event of exposure  
 The crossing of the metaphysical threshold and the clearing of an 
alternative path for thought is fraught with difficulties, for as Heidegger says, 
metaphysics are ingrained in modern technology which permeates all aspects of 
life and thought.22 But even if this difficulty is somehow overcome, there 
remains the additional problem that ‘Western languages are languages of 
metaphysical thinking.’23 Stepping out of metaphysics therefore requires an 
altogether different way of doing philosophy, one that will not be bound to 
subjectivity and representation to the same extent as Western languages. 
Following Heidegger, several philosophers attempted to exit metaphysical 
thought and establish direct contact with the ‘thought of the outside’ (Foucault). 
Lyotard brands this escape route as the post-modern sublime, which ‘puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself’.24 Lyotard approaches the 
sublime not as an image but as an event, an encounter with something 
immeasurable and pre-rational in which subjectivity is dissolved. Neither 
language nor visual representation can encompass these moments of the total 
dissolution of identity, which for Lyotard makes the sublime into a political 
problem, for it raises the question of accounting for the non-identical, 
minoritarian, culturally or politically unrepresented.25 Deleuze names it as 
‘difference in itself’ – a strange remainder that cannot be thought at all because 
it cannot be thought through with representational categories: 
[D]ifference in itself appears to exclude any relation between 
different and different which would allow it to be thought. It seems 
that it can become thinkable only when tamed–in other words, 
when subject to the four iron collars of representation: identity in 
______________________________________ 
22 ‘No one can know whether and when and where and how this step of thinking will develop 
into a proper (needed in appropriation) path and way and road-building. Instead, the rule of 
metaphysics may rather entrench itself, in the shape of modern technology with its 
developments rushing along boundlessly.’ Ibid., 72.  
23 Ibid., 73. 
24 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 81 
25 The political implications of the non- representational are developed by Lyotard in relation to 
questions of law and language-based schemas in The Differend, and in relation to the politics of 
the other in Heidegger and ‘the Jews’. 
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the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and 
resemblance in perception.’26 
Heidegger’s diagnosis of the metaphysical malaise is the ‘oblivion of the 
difference as such’: in metaphysical thought difference is subsumed under the 
copula ‘is’ (as in ‘A is A’) and the remedy is to think this forgotten and untamed 
difference not as an opposition to identity (for an opposition is still part of the 
same logic of representation) but as the arrival of presence that ‘assigns the 
difference of Being and beings to perdurance as the approach to their essence’.27 
The relation of being and beings must not be understood as identity but as the 
movement towards the primordial conditions that make identity possible. 
Heidegger names this wild and unexplored terrain ‘perdurance’. 
We attain to the nearness of the historic only in that sudden 
moment of a recall in thinking. … [this] holds true above all also 
for our attempt in the step back out of the oblivion of the difference 
as such, to think this difference as the perdurance of unconcealing 
overcoming and of self-keeping arrival.’28  
As Gillian Rose explains: “‘perdurance’… captures the idea of perfect 
duration, is a felicitous but strange translation of austag which means 
‘arrangement’ or ‘settlement’ in the litigious sense of settling something in 
court.”29 The requirement therefore is to think the relation of being and beings 
outside the linearity of chronological time as a kind of perfect duration that is 
not strictly temporal relation but a spatio-temporal event the holds being and 
beings apart as well as bringing them together. This highly complex notion of 
time can be perhaps understood as the ‘now’ - not in the sense of the present 
instant, or the orgiastic immediacy of religious ecstasy, but as the ‘now’ that 
marks the occurrence of an event, of something that happens. As Lyotard 
explains: ‘An event, and occurrence – what Martin Heidegger called ein 
Ereignis –  is infinitely simple, but this simplicity can only be approached 
______________________________________ 
26 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 330 
27 Ibid., 67. 
28 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 67. See supra 3.7, Perdurance, Heidegger’s move beyond 
dialectics. 
29 Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 
78. 
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through a state of privation.’30 The event of perdurance dismantles the principle 
of identity because in it the subject and the object are held simultaneously 
together and apart. Deleuze explains it thus:  
‘Lightening, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky 
but must also trail it behind, as through it were distinguishing itself 
from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the 
ground rose to the surface without ceasing to be ground.’31  
It seems that Deleuze found a way of grasping the ‘perdurance of 
unconcealing overcoming and of self-keeping arrival’32 as the moment of 
exposure that creates an event through a flash of lightning. It is possible that 
unknown to himself Heidegger opened a way for philosophy to move into a 
sphere where meaning is established purely through perdurance understood as 
exposure.  
To think about photography from the perspective of exposure will require 
the re-evaluation of the photographic ‘is’ as the factical correspondence 
between an image and the thing represented. Following Heidegger’s 
methodology, it requires suggesting that the verisimilitude and the credibility of 
the photographic image conceals an ‘event of appropriation’ in which the 
photographic is released from its everydayness, and difference – rather than 
identity – is able to rise to the surface. In other words, what is not considered by 
histories and theories of photography is the very fact that representation can be 
posited as the ground of correspondence between and image and a thing. Instead 
of thinking of the photographic image as something ‘given’ to perception, a 
‘step out’ of the is of representation betokens that there is an unseen image 
lurking beneath the visible in the photograph. This in turn can suggest that the 
photographic exposure is the specific image of the unity of technology and 
poesis in visual culture. Understood in this way, photography is no longer 
following the Platonic distinction between eikōn (image) and eidos (true reality) 
that dominated art history for two millennia. Understood as exposure, an image 
is not solely the subject of ‘viewing’, but rather it now reveals the essential 
______________________________________ 
30 Lyotard, The Lyotard Reader, 197. 
31 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 36.  
32 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 67. 
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origin of difference as the ground of representation. It also suggests that the 
poiēsis of photography is directly linked to exposure as the repeatable and 
unrepresentable action in which image and being belong together. Significantly, 
the recording of an exposure on photographic film results not in a visible image, 
as usually thought, but in an invisible latent image that remains unseen until the 
film is being chemically processed33. In the context of photography, the ‘step 
out of metaphysics’ can be specifically and concretely located in the notion of 
the latent image: the invisible image left on the light-sensitive surface by 
exposure.  
No impression can be seen, not even the slightest beginning of the 
picture, And yet the picture already exists there in all its perfection, 
but in a perfectly invisible state…’34  
The invisible (latent) state of the photographic image is generally 
overlooked in photographic theory, it is its blind spot. 35 however it is an 
indication that exposure pushes material perception beyond itself, into its origin 
as difference. By uncovering a pre-representational element of the photograph, 
the latent image allows to leap out of the ‘is’ of representation towards an event 
of appropriation. The latent image permits to rethink photography as a step-back 
out of the visual image into the event of difference that underwrites 
representation. However, in order to establish photography as fractal and 
mimetic surface, it is not enough to say that the latent image precedes 
representation, because the chronological relationship of ‘before and after’ is 
______________________________________ 
33 In digital photography, data is processed algorithmically rather then chemically, but the basic 
principle of the raw image being unknowable until it is processed still holds. See Rubinstein, 
Daniel, and Katrina Sluis. "The Digital Image in Photographic Culture; Algorithmic 
Photography and the Crisis of Representation." In The Photographic Image in Digital Culture. 
2nd Edition ed. Edited by Martin Lister. London: Routledge, September 1, 2013 22-41. 
34 Michel Frizot, New History of Photography, trans. Susan Bennett, Liz Clegg, John Crook and 
Caroline Higgitt (Paris: Könemann, 1998), 61 
35 As a rule, the latent image is mentioned very briefly in histories of photography, often in the 
context of Henry Fox Talbot’ discovery of the calotype process. Beaumont Newhall, The 
History of Photography: From 1839 to the Present. (New York: Museum of Modern Art. 
Boston. 1982), Beaumont Newhall, Latent Image: The Discovery of Photography. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), Vered Maimon, ”Displaced Origins: 
William Henry Fox Talbot's the Pencil of Nature,” History of Photography 32, no. 4 (2008): 
314-325. Frizot, New History of Photography.  
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itself a form of causality. What is required is to show that the latent image 
reconfigures photography’s relationship with time.  
If the latent image is considered as the is of photography, it suggests that 
there are two temporal registers involved in the production of the image: the 
first register is the chronological time in which the image is marked by its 
connection to past events or situations. It is the biological time of living bodies 
and ticking clocks in which the image carries a time-stamp of the past that 
marks its place along the straight line that stretches between the past and the 
future. The second temporal register, it is the time of the photographic exposure 
in which invisible to the eye image subsists in perfect stillness. This is the time 
of the event, the ‘now’ which is outside of representation, (the event that must 
be bracketed out by representation in order to constitute itself). It is the present 
that is constantly divided into past and future and is outside linear time, 
immeasurable and inhuman.  
In Logic of Sense Deleuze describes these two temporal series as Chronos 
and Aion:  
‘Inside Chronos, the present is in some manner corporeal. […] The 
present measures out the action of bodies and causes among 
themselves. […] [Aion is] [t]he pure and measureless becoming of 
qualities threatens the order of qualified bodies from within. Bodies 
have lost their measure and are now but simulacra. The past and 
the future, as unleashed forces, take their revenge, in one and the 
same abyss which threatens the present and everything that 
exists.’36  
These two regimes of temporality appear for the first time in Nietzsche’s 
Thus spoke Zarathustra where the time of Aion is linked to the eternal return:  
‘See this moment!’ I continued. “From this gateway Moment a 
long eternal lane stretches backward: behind us lies an eternity. 
Must not whatever can already have passed this way before? Must 
not whatever can happen, already have happened, been done, 
passed by before?’ […] And this slow spider that creeps in the 
moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you in the gateway 
______________________________________ 
36 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 186-7. 
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whispering together, whispering of eternal things–must not all of us 
have been here before?’37  
Two regimes of the image therefore: the visible image which is, as 
Deleuze says, ‘The present measures out the action of bodies and causes among 
themselves’ or in other words a monstration, an eruption, a revolution.38 And 
the invisible, intangible exposure, which is motionless, where nothing ever 
happens, time of stasis and of surfaces without depth. The exposure is the fusion 
of subject and object that erases the distinction between them, it is the ‘now’ 
that is neither form, nor content, but it is not without duration. The duration of 
the exposure is the holding together and keeping apart of beings and being. It is 
pre-individual because it is located in the temporal space of the event, before the 
emergence of subjectivity and the concomitant distinction between subject and 
object.39 
According to this non-dialectical understanding of photography as 
exposure, the visible photographic image is not opposed to, or separate from 
that which is invisible and absent, rather, the visible and the invisible are co-
present in the realm of the technological unfolding in which what is coming to 
presence is the event of non-chronological, immeasurable time. It is precisely 
because photography is generally considered as the technology that archives 
(chronological) time that it has a privileged relationship with the ‘event of 
appropriation’ (Ereignis) in which the ontological, non-chronological time is 
revealing itself as independent from past, present and future. The difference 
between the image of photography and the event of photography is therefore 
connected with a conception of time: The photographic image, by force of its 
technology presupposes the existence of reality outside itself and of a past of 
______________________________________ 
37 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. Ed. Adrian 
Del Caro and Robert Pippin trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 126. See also Heidegger, Nietzsche; The Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same, 37-44. 
38 ‘The image is what takes the thing out of its simple presence and brings it to pres-ence, to 
praes-entia, to being-out-in-front-of-itself, turned toward the outside […] Thus the image is, 
essentially,”monstrative” or ”monstrant.” Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff 
Fort (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 21. 
39 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 117. 
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which it is an image.  The photographic event, on the other hand, is the reality 
of technology itself as the revealing and concealing the way by which the actual 
reveals itself as the exposure of mechanical reproduction.  
Graven image: Heidegger and Yahweh 
Heidegger suggests that the step out of metaphysics necessitates an event 
of presence and owning (Ereignis) that knows no chronological time because it 
is an instance of perfect duration: a direct, unmediated relation of Being and 
beings. Gillian Rose drily comments:  
‘It seems that unknown to himself, Heidegger has brought us into 
the orbit of Biblical Hebrew; a language which has imperfect and 
perfect tenses but no past, present and future tenses, and which has 
no possessive verb ‘to have’; a language of the kind into which 
Heidegger attempts to transcribe German.’40 
Rose points out the similarities between perdurance as ‘the highest most 
significant event of all / a giving of presence that prevails in the present, in the 
past and in the future…’41 and Yahweh (the god of Israel in the Hebrew Bible): 
‘In the Hebrew Yahweh speaks in the imperfect tense which announces His 
Perdurance: His presence in the future and past as well as present.’42 
Rose further clarifies what exactly Heidegger is taking from the Jewish 
religion: ‘Heidegger seems to give us Yahweh without Torah: the event seems 
to include advent and redemption, presence and owning…’43 However, Rose 
leaves out what is perhaps the most significant attribute of Yahweh for the 
understanding of perdurance: the ban on depicting the god of Israel in an image.  
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto 
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water 
under the earth.44 
______________________________________ 
40 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 78.  
41 Heidegger, ‘Time and Being’, Quoted in Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 78-79n8. 
42 Ibid., 79. 
43 Ibid., 80. 
44 Exodus 20:3-4 (King James Bible) 
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It is significant that in these verses the ban on representing god follows 
immediately after the ban on having other gods and can be understood as a 
separate prohibition: It is forbidden to worship other gods and it is forbidden to 
make images of god. 45 The two main justifications for the Hebraic ban on 
representation help to clarify the relevance of representation to the question of 
perdurance. The first is concerned with the use of predicates to describe god. 
Statements such as ‘god exists’ or ‘god is one’ create an impression of an object 
to which different predicates can apply, which contradicts the idea of god’s 
unity.46 Similarly, for Heidegger, the true nature of being understood as 
perdurance cannot be represented through predication: 
Someone wants to buy fruit in a store. He asks for fruit. He is 
offered apples and pears, he is offered peaches, cherries, grapes. 
But he rejects all that is offered. He absolutely wants to have fruit. 
What was offered to him in every instance is fruit and yet, it turns 
out, fruit cannot be bought. It is still infinitely more impossible to 
represent ‘Being’ as the general characteristic of beings.47 
The second aspect of the ban on representation concerns the relationship 
of perdurance to time. According to Maimonides, who uses the Aristotelian 
definition of time as dependent on motion, the concept of time does not apply to 
god.48 The ban on representation is therefore not only the assertion of the 
invisibility of god, but it is meant to determine the absolute otherness of god 
and the essential categorical difference between god and all other forms of 
being.49 
______________________________________ 
45 Moshe Halbertal, and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 37. As Halbertal and Margalit indicate, the claim that god has 
no image is one of the foundations of the neo-Aristotelian teaching of Maimonides, however 
there are other traditions within Judaism, particularly the rabbinic tradition and the cabala that 
contain literary descriptions of god. Ibid., 46-47. 
46 Ibid., 58.  
47 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 66. 
48 ‘It is quite clear that there is no relation between God and time or space. For time is an 
accident connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriority and 
posteriority … and since motion is one of the conditions to which only material bodies are 
subject, and God is immaterial, there can be no relation between him and time.’ Moses 
Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed. 2 ed., trans. Michael Friedlander (London: Forgotten 
Books, 1904), (I,LII). See also Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 58. 
49 Ibid., 59. 
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The ban on graven images seems to be connected to the perfect and 
transitive presence that is outside of time and constitutes the event of all events. 
Heidegger’s notion of perdurance is therefore related not only to the presencing 
of Jehovah – as Gillian Rose suggests – but also to the ban on representation 
and the general iconoclasm of the Judaic tradition. It follows that Perdurance is 
a leap out of visual representation into the essence of visual representation: ‘The 
step out of metaphysics is the step out of technology and technological 
description … into the essence of modern technology…’50 While Gillian Rose 
asserts that the step out of metaphysics takes Heidegger into Biblical Hebrew, it 
is the assertion of this paper that this leap does not go far enough, as all 
languages – including Hebrew and German – are misleading and limited in the 
description of perdurance because they necessarily evoke the speaking subject. 
In any case, there are two reasons for the unsuitability of language for the task 
of capturing perdurance. First the syntactic structure of language creates a 
duality between subject and predicate which makes it unsuitable to talk about 
oneness.51 The second is that language that is used for the description of 
familiar reality is unsuitable for the description of the absolute other.52 The 
normative linguistic categories of predication and existence do not apply to 
perdurance.53 For that reason, the leap advocated on these pages is from the 
orbit of language into the orbit of photography. However, photography must be 
understood not as a homogenous entity but as a constellation of recursive and 
self-replicating exposures.  
______________________________________ 
50 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 52. 
51 cf. ‘It is impossible to represent in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’ as it is in 
geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give 
the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.’ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
philosophicus, trans. Brian McGuinness and David Pears (London: New York: Routledge, 
2001), 13 (3.032)  
52 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 59. In What is Called Thinking Heidegger suggests that 
overcoming the tendency of language to privilege logic can be achieved through poetry. 
Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, 3-18. In The Logic of Sense Deleuze emphasises the 
importance of paradoxes and portmanteau as a way of setting up new forms of rationality. 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 3-6, 7-15. see also: Lecercle, Deleuze and Language. 
53 ‘The difference of being and beings, as the differentiation of overwhelming and arrival, is the 
perdurance (Austrag) of the two in unconcealing keeping in concealment’. Heidegger, Identity 
and Difference, 65. 
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Conclusion: is thought photographic? 
Photography, therefore, is not only images. It is also a process of self-
replicating cloning that is recursive, plural and proliferating. A reflection on 
photography requires us to question not only the correspondence between 
images and objects but also to ask how photography stands in relation to the age 
of information technology, genetic cloning and nuclear physics.54 The multitude 
of forms that photography continues to assume in contemporary life suggests 
that we are not dealing with one image system among many, but with the basic 
semantic unit of visual communication everywhere.55 Historically, photography 
was invented during the 19th century and is therefore welded to the dominant 
ideology of capitalist production. But ontologically, photography introduces an 
image into the midst of thought, bringing within it not only representational 
verisimilitude but also the pre-representational event of difference. Thinking of 
photography as exposure allows to free it from the dogmas associated with the 
principle of identity.  
Photography is inseparable from the age of technology as lightning is 
inseparable from the sky. It is the first art of the information age (not in a 
chronological but logical sense) because despite its assurance of frontal 
resemblance photography also creates an image of life in general. While 
classical representation operates (as we saw) by isolating the subject of study 
from its surroundings, photography reaches across boundaries, disciplines and 
discourses. The principle of identity is A=A, but the principle of photography 
understood as endlessly repeated exposure exposure is A+A+A…+A. The 
repetitive, reproductive process that we encounter time and again in the 
photograph helps us realise that all processes in nature are connected through 
flows of energy and matter. Through this recursive movement of dissemination 
and reproduction photography manifests itself not only as a representation but 
also as an event that is outside of the distinctions between subject and object. To 
______________________________________ 
54 On photography and the discovery of the molecule of DNA see Philosophy of Photography 
4(2), (forthcoming).  
55 ‘[T]he photographic is not best understood as a particular art; it is currently the dominant 
form of the image in general. ’ Osborne, Peter. “Infinite Exchange: The Social Ontology of the 
Photographic Image.” Philosophy of Photography 1, no. 1 (2010): 59-68. 
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ask about photography as exposure is to explore the foundations of the deep 
rooted belief that representation is effortless and universal. For Heidegger and 
later for Deleuze this belief is not only limiting, it is also ultimately life denying 
because it assumes that there is an independently given reality of which 
representation is a faithful copy.  
Thinking that can do justice to the ‘information age’ cannot itself be 
detached from Photography. Just as during the previous, ‘industrial age’ 
machines replaced physical labour not by replicating human metabolism and 
muscle tissue but by utilising different sources of energy (petroleum) and 
different processes (internal combustion), the new machines that we refer to as 
'computers' do not operate with the categories of human logic such as form 
versus content, synthesis or dialectical reasoning. And just as the industrial age 
not only replaced human labour with the labour of a machine but also radically 
reconfigured human society, so the age of the computer not only replaces the 
work of the brain with the work of the machine but also reconfigures human 
society by implanting on it elements of computational logic such as multiplicity, 
simultaneity, self-replication and undecidability. The significance of 
photography is in part at least due to the way it allows us to understand 
information society not as it is represented in language, but as it is figured by 
the mechanically produced visual image. 
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